Palestinian Arabs: Cannon Fodder 

The Arab countries that surround Israel, have sent their armies to destroy Israel 3 X and all three times they have been rebuffed, defeated, and humiliated. This is devastating to the Arab man, they’re the most insecure male population in the world. Muhammad taught them to humiliate the Kafir, especially Jews. 

Instead of showing humility and allowing the Jewish people to repopulate the land that they are indigenous to and live in peace, they refuse, the religion of Islam does not allow for it, nor does the example that they are commanded to follow, the life of Muhammad the perfect human being and the embodiment of Islam. 

Adherents of the religion of peace are deceivers schemers the most prolific Liars in history, so that’s what they’ve done and that’s what they will do to try and race Israel off the map, thus the creation of an underdog a marginalized and oppressed people, victims of Zionist racism, regardless of their very real anti-semitism and anti-semitic laws that run throughout the Islamic world, they created the Palestinian people to use as a political tool to deligitmize the state of Israel the most legal nation-state in history.

A refresher.

After the 3rd Roman-Jewish War or The Bar Kokhba Revolt, Roman Emperor Hadrian renamed Jewish homeland of Judea Syria Palestina in an effort to wipe out the memory of the Jews completely. Did Roman army have sufficiently depopulated Jerry of Jews during war by 860,000 that many or more died out of famine and disease.
This new area has never been inhabited to a large extent large enough for anybody to claim it as their own, but Jews have remained there throughout. You could just as easily call a Jew, which they have at times, a Palestinian Jew or like they have Arabs living in the area were Palestinian Arabs. Prior to 67, the conflict was called the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The truth is Palestinian nationalism was a minority position, one powerful Arab leader, Auni Bey Abdul-Hadi, declared “There is no such country as Palestine! ‘Palestine’ is a term the Zionists invented! There is no Palestine in the Bible. Our country was for centuries part of Syria.”

When Syrian President Hafez Assad addressed, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat by saying, “There is no such thing as a Palestinian people, there is no Palestinian entity, there is only Syria. You are an integral part of the Syrian people, Palestine is an integral part of Syria. Therefore it is we, the Syrian authorities, who are the true representatives of the Palestinian people.”
Arafat was in no place to rebuke him as a few years earlier, he himself had declared…
The question of borders doesn’t interest us… From the Arab standpoint, we mustn’t talk about borders. Palestine is nothing but a drop in an enormous ocean. Our nation is the Arabic nation that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and beyond it… The PLO. is fighting Israel in the name of Pan-Arabism. What you call “Jordan” is nothing more than Palestine.

– Yasser Arafat 

And it wasn’t just the Palestinians and Syrians saying this…

The truth is that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan

– King Hussein of Jordan 

Why is it that on June 4th 1967 I was a Jordanian and overnight I became a Palestinian?

– Walid Shoebat, a former PLO terroris

PLO dependence on the Arab states also goes far to explain the paradox of PLO strength internationally and its wretched relations with ordinary Arabs and Palestinians. For the PLO is simultaneously the UN’s most popular liberation front and the movement no Arab state wants to host; the toast of radical and Islamic groups around the world but widely resented throughout the Middle East. On the one hand, it enjoys a voice in Arab councils, wealth, vast military supplies, and a claim to be the political voice of the Palestinians. On the other hand, it regularly murders opponents, relies on mercenaries and children to do its fighting, and uses civilians as military cover.

Because meeting the Arab demand for ideological purity counts more than satisfying the interests of Palestinians, the PLO does not pressure Arab governments to enfranchise Palestinian refugees in the various Arab countries in which they have been living since 1948, it does not work to win them citizenship or the right to own land, nor does it take other practical steps to help them alleviate their plight. No wonder a 1980 poll revealed that only half of 1,200 Palestinian students in Kuwait considered the PLO to be their sole representative.

As for the Palestinians on the West Bank, the leaders needed to promote their interests will not be found in the PLO. While a group of mayors on the West Bank prepared a document in December 1982 calling for the “peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem” through the “mutual and simultaneous recognition” of the PLO and Israel, and while in that same month four lecturers from Bi’r Zeit University stated that most of the students at their university favored territorial compromise with Israel, PLO leaders were reconfirming their intent to destroy Israel militarily. But what do mayors and students matter when heads of state give money, arms, and diplomatic support? Despite the fact that Israel enjoys complete military superiority over the Arabs and will for years to come, despite the daily advance of Israeli settlements on the West Bank, the PLO sticks to its hopeless irredentism. To do otherwise would jeopardize its standing and perhaps even its existence. When a ruler like Mu’ammar al-Qadhdhafi announces that “If the Palestinian resistance recognizes Israel, we will not do so,” this cannot but influence PLO behavior.
Of many examples of PLO brutality toward the Palestinians (on the West Bank, in Gaza, Israel, and Jordan), the most dramatic took place in South Lebanon between 1975 and 1982, where the PLO enjoyed a nearly sovereign authority. As an illustration of its inability to win support from below, developments there repay consideration.

When PLO guerrillas were initially stationed in South Lebanon following the 1967 war, their struggle against Israel enjoyed the sympathy of local Lebanese, especially the Shi’is. Relations between residents and the PLO deteriorated, however, as Israel’s overwhelming military superiority dashed hopes of the conflict being moved to Israeli territory. Instead, the PLO settled into South Lebanon. Its troops, better armed and organized than other militias in the area, compelled the Lebanese to supply sustenance, shelter, medical services, and money. By 1975, the PLO constituted an elite that effectively controlled South Lebanon, flouting local regulations and enforcing its will in capricious ways. PLO soldiers billeted themselves in the best houses, grabbed what they fancied, expelled property owners, availed themselves of local women, indulged in random violence, directed drug and prostitution rings, and ran protection rackets. Foreign mercenaries employed by the PLO became especially notorious for extracting whatever they could from South Lebanon, and the PLO’s thirty autonomous groups, each with its own loosely disciplined troops, wrought havoc upon the civilian population.
The result was a reign of terror. For seven years the outside world heard little from South Lebanon – in part because the inhabitants feared retribution if they talked, in part because the PLO kept journalists from the region. When its control was broken and newsmen appeared in June 1982, stories of life under the PLO began to filter out. Everyone seemed to have a tale – Muslim and Christian, Sunni and Shi’i, Lebanese and Palestinian – and was eager to tell it.
Appalling accounts of cruelty and malevolence came to light. Any show of defiance of the PLO met severe punishments. A Muslim religious dignitary in Haruf, Sa’id Badr ad-Din, who refused to incorporate Palestinian themes into his weekly sermons, lost his son, murdered by the PLO. Mahmud al-Masri, a Shi’i religious leader in Ansar, led the opposition to PLO entry into the village in 1980; he was tied up and forced to witness the rape, execution, and mutilation of his fifteen-year old daughter. On 19 October 1976, about 1,000 PLO troops stormed Ayshiyeh, a small Christian village whose citizens were suspected of cooperation with Israel; the PLO forced all but 65 of the villagers into a church, guarding them with cocked guns while those outside were systematically executed in the streets. The villagers held in the church heard the whole massacre; when let out after two days, they found the bodies lying in pools of blood. To compound its cruelty, the PLO brought a fleet of trucks to the village and emptied the houses during those two days. After the residents buried the dead, all but a few abandoned their homes.
To maintain its reputation, the PLO acted with calculated ferocity. When a search squad in Sidon turned up Israeli money and clothing in a man’s house, the PLO took the owner to Sidon’s central square, chained his arms and legs to the bumpers of four cars, and ripped him apart; while the body was yet in its death throes the four cars dragged it around the square. Witnesses testified to the sadistic torture carried out at the PLO prison in Sidon, a former municipal school whose basements became notorious. Above its dungeons was an “entertainment center” for the prison commanders, consisting of an iron bed under Stars of David drawn in blood, used for gang rapes. Although the screams of young girls cold be heard all over the district, no one dared intervene. Unverified reports had it that when PLO hospital blood reserves ran low, new supplies were obtained by bleeding civilian patients to death. And so on: as the local population became intimidated by such atrocities no one dared challenge the PLO.

Lebanese authorities stood helplessly by. In the words of Khalil Shamrayya, a shopkeeper in Sidon, “‘Arafat’s gangs simply eliminated the rule of law and order and allowed sheer anarchy to reign.” Police and politicians reported to work as usual, but handled only municipal services and other matters disdained by the PLO. As “People’s Committees” replaced courts, elected Lebanese officials saluted PLO officers and violence went unpunished. “Ultimate authority was with the Kalashnikov [the Soviet gun] and they had it,” observed a prominent Sidon doctor, Ramzi Shabb.
Unable to fight the Israeli army on equal terms, the PLO protected itself with the lives of innocent Lebanese, using civilian facilities – homes, churches, schools, hospitals especially – as shields against Israeli retaliation. Even the Roman ruins at Tyre were converted into a military base, with weapons stored in the seats of the hippodrome. When PLO missiles hit the Galilee, civilians in South Lebanon paid the greatest price, for Israel responded with tenfold punishment. A bitter joke has it that a sheikh once went over to the PLO fighters camped near his village and requested that they fire their rockets at his village rather than into Israel. Mystified, the PLO leader asked the reason; the Lebanese replied, “Every time you shoot three rockets at Israel, they fire back twenty; so do us a favor and shoot at us directly!” In what came to be known as the “last massacre” during the Israeli advance of June 1982, PLO fighters deliberately brought down maximum destruction in South Lebanon, provoking the Israelis into bombing anti-PLO villages (such as Burg-Bahal) by taking up military positions as close to them as possible.
The Lebanese were also harmed economically. A backward region, South Lebanon could not cope with the large sums of money the PLO dispensed. Severe inflation which began in the mid-70s cut into the real earnings of laborers and reduced the value of savings. It also made working for the PLO, with its high wages, more attractive.

Even Palestinians, who should have benefited from the activities of the PLO, were victimized, as the PLO’s constant problems with recruitment demonstrate. Any male Palestinian in Lebanon could receive $150 to $200 a month – as much as an agricultural worker – just for joining a PLO militia; then he had only to train briefly in the use of weapons, participate in parades, and show up for an occasional operation. In addition, his wife got $130 a month plus a small amount for each child. Yet these high wages were not enough, even in combination with a shortage of employment and ideological fervor. So alienated were Palestinians living in Lebanon from the PLO that it had to take active measures to recruit sufficient numbers of soldiers; characteristically, it resorted to coercion. The PLO enjoyed the enthusiastic support of over twenty Arab states, two dozen other Muslim countries, most of Africa, and the Communist bloc, but it could not attract Palestinian men to fight for its cause.
In 1968, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Ghani, a thirty-year-old assistant pharmacist, received a letter from Yasir Arafat threatening to expel him from his home and job unless he joined Al-Fat’h. Fearing for his life (“If I stay, they may kill me”), he joined As-Sa’iqa, one of Al-Faith’s rival organizations within the PLO, becoming a recruiting agent until an opportunity arose to drop out, which he did. Although rounded up by the Israelis last summer and held in a camp, he said he was pleased with the destruction of the PLO in Lebanon. Now, “they will never catch me. There will be no more Yasir ‘Arafat.”
At the age of sixteen, boys could get $130 a month for joining the youth movement, Ashbal. Boys as young as twelve were compelled to serve. Some schools run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency required youths, on penalty of expulsion, to fulfill an annual PLO tour of duty, lasting from one to three months; other schools required daily military drills of male students. The Israelis – after getting over the initial shock of being shot at by children – captured more than 200 soldiers under twelve years of age. The PLO put up spot checkpoints to catch Palestinians evading the draft. On occasion Fat’h soldiers surrounded the refugee camps, closed the exits, and searched the houses for eligible young men.

Palestinians who left the refugee camps hoping to become integrated into Lebanese society were harassed, forced either to serve in the Palestine Liberation Army or to buy their way out of duty. Several thousand mercenaries from a dozen or so countries, including the Arab states, Senegal, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, took their money and replaced them in the field. Indian mercenaries in Lebanon in the fall of 1981 numbered nearly 1,000; according to a magazine investigation, most of them took up military service when they failed to get other work (they had entered Lebanon illegally), and they earned about $200 a month. So desperate was the PLO for fighters, it paid Lebanese beggar boys like young Haysam Muhammad Rabi’a $250 to enlist in the infantry. But such recruits made poor soldiers; Haysam was captured by Phalange troops in June 1982 as his unit attacked the town of Bhamdam while in a drugged and drunken condition.
The PLO’s response to the Israeli invasion in the summer of 1982 illustrated the way its leaders distinguished their own interests from the Palestinians’ as a whole. At a critical time in July, as the city of Beirut ran short of food supplies, the PLO commandeered a United Nations warehouse in West Beirut, blocking the distribution of flour, rice, sugar, corn beef, and milk powder to 30,000 Palestinians, including many homeless families from South Lebanon. Worse yet, according to Sa’d Milham, a seventy-eight-year-old Palestinian, the PLO used Palestinian civilians – their own people – as cannon fodder. When inhabitants of the Ein Hilwe refugee camp in Sidon took shelter in a mosque, the fighters pushed them outside to draw Israeli fire; those who refused to cooperate were shot at in the mosque. On a larger scale, the PLO used the entire civilian population of West Beirut as a shield, letting non-combatants suffer the worst casualties and hoping that civilian deaths would so upset world opinion the Israelis would be compelled to call off their siege.
The PLO as Dictatorship
Assessments of the PLO are often confused by the fact that it provides services to Palestinians, employs them, and even sometimes protects them. Can an organization that performs all these functions really be so harmful to its own people?
To understand this better, it is helpful to view the PLO as a government rather than as a guerrilla organization, for its behavior resembles that of “progressive” regimes in the Middle East far more closely than that of other “liberation movements.” Certainly, PLO treatment of civilians in South Lebanon makes it unique among guerrilla groups: Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean forces terrorized white Rhodesians but not the Zambians among whom for years they lived, and the Sandinistas did not harm Nicaragua’s neighboring peoples. The Communist movement in China, the FLN in Algeria, and for that matter Menachem Begin’s Irgun would have collapsed had they treated their own people as does the PLO.

The PLO can act as it does because it does not depend on support from below; so long as it satisfies the Arab rulers, it monopolizes the Palestinian national movement and can behave as an established government. The qualities it displays-disproportionate involvement in international politics, ideological extremism, grandiose ambitions, brutality-are the hallmarks of most Middle Eastern regimes; they are especially characteristic of the oil-exporting states which, like the PLO, live off money from outside sources. They, like the PLO, do provide basic services and do build economically-even as they threaten their people with force and intimidation. The Syrian authorities conquered their own city of Hama in early 1982 at the expense of thousands of civilian lives (estimates of the death toll vary between 3,000 to 25,000). The Sunni rulers of Iraq wage war on the Kurds and repress the Shi’is. South Yemen lives in a darkness so complete the outside world knows almost nothing about it. Qadhdhafi has turned Libya into a maelstrom.
In short, the PLO’s acts of violence against its own people – grenades against laborers seeking work in Israel, bullets for those on the West Bank and Gaza who disagree with its policies, truncheons for those living in the camps – closely resemble the policies of the governments that champion it most fervently. Remove the framework of a “liberation movement,” and what remains is the sort of dictatorial regime all too familiar in the Middle East. Only the fact that the PLO does not rule a territory endows it with the aura of romance lacking in “progressive” states already in power. But the PLO’s record should make its character clear enough. Like other radical movements, this organization appeals to two groups primarily – the elite that it benefits and the distant admirers who stay far enough away to avoid the consequences.

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